Scott Morrison has managed to create yet another political storm for himself and the Liberal Party – and in the process drag the governor-general and his office into it.
Many voters already knew they could not trust Morrison to do the job right and fired him at the last election. But could they now be blamed for asking themselves whether the governor-general has also failed to discharge his constitutional obligations?
Former prime minister Scott Morrison with Governor-General David Hurley.Credit:Tracey Nearmy/Getty Images
In the past 48 hours, we have learnt that in 2020 and 2021 Morrison appointed himself to five ministries, in addition to the office of prime minister, and did so with almost no pushback from the governor-general, David Hurley.
The governor-general is required to act on advice of the government in making ministerial appointments. But that does not mean that he has to do so immediately – without first asking a few hard questions.
Indeed, constitutional best practice suggests the governor-general should have paused Morrison in 2020 and 2021 and asked the following three questions:
“Are these appointments really necessary?”
“Could we wait until someone is actually sick and make provision now for a virtual model of appointment?”
“How is the arrangement going to work?”
Morrison has now offered a sensible explanation for why he sought the relevant appointments: he was trying to create backup capacity in key ministerial positions, should it be necessary to step in and cover a minister felled by COVID-19.
This kind of “two-key” approach also makes a lot of sense. It is one reason major firms have developed contingency plans for how to manage absences in key roles during the pandemic.
And it is one of many reasons I am a proud advocate of shared leadership models: as my own experience at UNSW attests, they help build in excess capacity to cover illness and emergencies.
But the part that does not add up is that Morrison failed to explain to the public that he was taking these precautionary measures, and worse, to tell key ministers involved.
The latter failure is especially troubling. It suggests he did not consult cabinet before taking these extraordinary steps, or have a clear plan for communicating how and when any such residual ministerial power would be exercised.
Maybe the public could wait to be told about the backup plan until it was put into action. Making us wait seems both unwise and undemocratic. But maybe Morrison was genuinely concerned to avoid causing public panic.
But the federal cabinet, and the ministers involved, could not wait to be told. The whole idea of responsible government is that it is a system based on a collective process of deliberation (by cabinet), and individual ministerial responsibility (to parliament).
In appointing himself, without consulting or telling key colleagues, Morrison also blatantly ignored both these constitutional principles.
The immediate harm from these actions may have been limited. Ultimately, Morrison did not exercise most of the powers he granted himself, except in the dying days of his government – when he seemed worried that the only way to win was to override the Nationals on gas, without telling voters about another split in the Coalition.
But the indirect harm was significant. Morrison’s actions undermined already fragile norms of collective and accountable decision-making in Canberra. And now that we know about it, he has further undermined public trust in our democracy.
The question this raises is what, if anything, we could have done to prevent this, or how we might prevent it in the future.
A federal integrity body is a good idea, but unlikely to prevent this kind of conduct.
The High Court could potentially provide some check. In the UK, the Supreme Court invalidated the prorogation of parliament in the lead up to Brexit, essentially on the basis that former prime minister Boris Johnson improperly advised the Queen in this context.
But the most likely check comes in two forms: not electing leaders with strongly centralising, secretive tendencies, and demanding more from our head of state.
The most important question our head of state should have asked is: “How is the two-key model going to work?” and insisted on a dialogue with both Morrison and the affected ministers on this issue.
We know how two keys to a building are meant to work. But it gets a lot trickier when there are two building managers.
This is one reason shared leadership models need to be carefully designed, clearly communicated and continually reviewed.
The prime minister’s two-keys model also fell-down on each of these levels. It was ad hoc, secret and, as far as we know, never questioned.
While it is unclear whether the governor-general did highlight these concerns to the prime minister. If he did not, he should have done so, and must surely now consider whether his position is tenable.
Rosalind Dixon is a Professor of Law & Director of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law at UNSW Sydney. She is also the author of a study on job-sharing, and currently Co-Deputy Vice Chancellor for Equity, Diversity and Inclusion at UNSW.
The Opinion newsletter is a weekly wrap of views that will challenge, champion and inform your own. Sign up here.
Most Viewed in Politics
From our partners
Source: Read Full Article
